(Para)Graphs

30May

The Global Structure of Dependency

This graph classifies countries into centre (above-average GDP per capita) and periphery (below-average), then further into productive or extractive based on their commodity dependence ratio (CDR): those with over 60% of exports in primary goods are extractive; the rest, productive. It also tracks two structural imbalances—polarisation, via normalised GDP per capita, and dependency, via the Exchange Rate Deviation Index (ERDI), which measures divergence between market exchange rates and purchasing power parity (PPP). Covering 1995–2008 and 2009–2023, the data reveals three key trends: the productive centre’s share of global manufacturing exports shrinks while the productive periphery grows, reflecting offshoring and centre deindustrialisation; industrial growth in the periphery has not closed the income gap, challenging the idea that industrialisation leads to convergence; and persistent currency undervaluation in the periphery entrenches unequal terms of trade.

Based on: Ricci, A. (2025). Global Structure of Dependency and Socio-ecological Crisis: Intersecting Delinking and Degrowth for an Ecosocialist Transition. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 36(2), 1–21.

30May

The Extraction-Consumption Inversion

From 1970 to 2024, global resource extraction surged from 31 to 106 gigatons, with about 30 percent consistently tied to traded goods. This growth is marked by stark inequalities and a zero-sum dynamic: more resources flowing to high-income countries means fewer for low-income ones. Based on data tracking traded raw materials and their embodiment as Raw Material Equivalents (RMEs) in (semi-)finished products, the group of high-income countries is the only one with cumulative net imports, totalling 290 Gt. All other income groups were net exporters, with low-income countries collectively exporting 9.6 Gt. The graph here adds an important nuance: while their exports are the smallest in absolute terms, the drain is significant relative to what they extract. As a group, low-income countries consumed 13.3 percent less than they extracted, sending the rest to global markets. Meanwhile, high-income countries consumed 24.1 percent more than they extracted, bridging the gap with imports.

Source: Rammelt, C., & Ylla-Catala, R. C. (2025). Ecological Unequal Exchange: Winners and Losers in Global Raw Material Trade and Consumption. Journal of World-Systems Research, 31(1), 341–372.

17Apr

Winners and Losers in Raw Material Trade

This graph illustrates ecological unequal exchange—a theory that challenges the idea that trade benefits all. Instead, it shows how global trade deepens injustices through uneven resource flows. On the y-axis: Raw Material Trade Balances (RTB). A positive RTB means a country is a net importer of embodied raw materials (used anywhere along the supply chain). A negative RTB means it’s a net exporter. Colours indicates income levels, and the pattern is clear: wealthy nations dominate the importing side draining resources from the rest of the world, with notable outliers like Australia and Canada, which export more than they import. The x-axis shows per capita Raw Material Consumption. Lower-income countries cluster on the left, consuming far less per person. Trend lines from 1992 to 2022 show rising global consumption—especially among wealthier nations. But China stands out: once a major exporter, it now imports more than it exports and is rapidly approaching U.S. consumption levels. The bubble size reflects 2022 Domestic Value Added—the total value captured from trade. The U.S. and China lead, each capturing over $3 trillion. A grim pattern emerges: the farther a country is from trade balance (RTB = 0), the larger the bubble. In other words, the more a country exploits the environment, whether abroad (e.g., U.S., China, Japan, Germany) or domestically (e.g., Australia, Canada, Russia, Brazil), the more it earns.

Source: Rammelt, C., & Ylla-Catala, R. C. (2025). Ecological Unequal Exchange: Winners and Losers in Global Raw Material Trade and Consumption. Journal of World-Systems Research, 31(1), 341–372.

27Mar

Will technology save Thelma and Louise?

Thelma and Louise go on a road trip to escape their mundane lives. Things escalate. Louise shoots a guy, and suddenly, they’re fugitives, speeding toward Mexico. Along the way, they rob a store, blow up a truck, and experience the liberating effects of felony. The police give chase.
To escape, they press the gas pedal—an input device that increases fuel consumption in exchange for velocity. More speed means more fuel burned. Eventually, Thelma and Louise will run out.
“No problem,” says Louise, the techno-optimist. “We’ll just improve efficiency!”
This is where gears come in. Lower gears provide torque but burn fuel inefficiently. Higher gears let the engine run at lower revolutions per minute, increasing mileage—until they don’t. Once in top gear, efficiency maxes out. Any further increase in speed requires more fuel, a simple but inconvenient law of physics. Thelma and Louise are now in 6th gear, accelerating, consuming more and more just to maintain acceleration (see graph). Efficiency wasn’t a solution; it only postponed the inevitable. The problem remains: the police are still on their tail.
Cornered at the Grand Canyon, they must make a choice. Maybe they’ll hit the brakes. Maybe they’ll surrender. But the thing about accelerating toward a cliff is that the faster you go, the less time you have to stop. Keep pressing the pedal, and soon stopping is no longer an option.
“No problem,” says Louise, ever the optimist. “As we burn fuel, the car gets lighter. Less weight means less rolling resistance. Less rolling resistance means more speed. At a certain velocity, aerodynamic lift reduces friction even further. Soon, we won’t even need the road. We’ll fly, Thelma! No cliff to worry about when we’re airborne!”
At which point, the problem is no longer the cliff. It’s that Thelma and Louise are now climbing toward the sun, and combustion engines don’t handle that well.
“No problem,” says Louise. “We’ll just get a Tesla.”

Source: Thanks DC for the inspiration.

20Mar

The Myth of Infinite Efficiency

There’s no absolute global decoupling of material consumption from economic growth—just some relative decoupling, and even that’s fading. The world economy is becoming more resource-intensive, not less. With all our technological advances, shouldn’t we be getting more efficient?! Apparently not—at least not at the global scale, which is what truly matters. Instead, we see re-coupling: the economy pulling material consumption right back up. The relative decoupling of 1970–1986 is gone. We’re in a phase of material intensification. Why? Once physical efficiency limits are reached, GDP growth simply drives resource use back up. James Hopeward’s highway analogy nails it: Economic growth is like accelerating on the highway—more speed, more fuel. Shifting gears improves efficiency, but once you hit 5th gear, there are no more gains. From there, any increase in speed demands more fuel. That’s where we are now. The efficiency phase has maxed out, and growth is burning through more and more resources. Decoupling isn’t a permanent fix; It’s temporary. And we’re still speeding toward ever-higher material consumption.

Based on: World GDP: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD and Domestic Extraction: https://www.resourcepanel.org/global-material-flows-database

9Jan

Limited circularity in global production

  This material flow diagram from the latest Global Resources Outlook indicates that the global economy consumed 106 billion tonnes of materials in 2019, 91% of which came from extraction and harvesting, while a mere 9% (9.5 billion tonnes) came from recycled or recovered resources. Despite growing attention to circularity, the reality is stark: Energy needs alone account for 40% of this consumption (which cannot be recycled), while the remaining 60% supports durable assets like buildings and infrastructure, as well as consumer products. Waste flows are massive, generating 30 billion tonnes of solid and liquid waste and 47 billion tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions. Material stocks, which have surged since the 1970s, experienced a net addition of 31 billion tonnes in 2019. Experts estimate that maximal resource recovery could only reach 30–40%, and even that would be inherently challenging: re-concentrating dispersed materials demands significant energy, which itself cannot be recycled and entails unavoidable losses. This necessitates a constant influx of fresh matter and energy. While the biosphere can regenerate some of our wastes into raw materials, it cannot sustain this service at the accelerating pace of economic growth. A radical shift toward degrowth is essential; without it, circularity becomes empty rhetoric.

Source: Bruyninckx, H. H. D., Hellweg, S., Schandl, S., Vidal, H., Razian, B., Nohl, H., … & Christopher Pfister, S. (2024). Global Resources Outlook 2024: Bend the trend-Pathways to a liveable planet as resource use spikes. United Nations Environment Programme.

13Dec

Decent living energy requires lower inequality

Universal decent living energy (DLE) would cut global energy use to about a third of its current levels. However, in a scenario where no one lives below DLE levels and energy inequalities remain near current levels, total energy consumption doubles compared to a fully egalitarian world with everyone living at DLE levels. The graph illustrates energy per capita in 2050 across three inequality scenarios, alongside current energy distribution. In a “fair inequality” scenario, where the global top 1% consumes 2.7 times more than the bottom 10% (living at DLE levels), energy consumption increases by 40% compared to an egalitarian world. Achieving DLE without sharply reducing inequality would require unprecedented technological advancements to meet climate goals. Instead of unrealistic techno-optimism, we should reduce energy inequality.

Source: Millward-Hopkins, J. (2022). Inequality can double the energy required to secure universal decent living. Nature Communications, 13(1), 5028.

17Nov

Who’s breaching the planetary boundaries?

Rampant consumption, unsustainable production, and unchecked resource extraction have driven the planet beyond the stable conditions of the Holocene, breaching critical planetary boundaries. Who bears the responsibility? While the capitalist supply system is undoubtedly a key driver, the wealthiest populations disproportionately contribute to this crisis: in 2017, the richest 10% of global consumers were responsible for 43% of carbon emissions, 23% of land-system changes, 26.1% of nitrogen fixation, 24.7% of phosphorus use, 18.5% of water consumption, and 37.2% of biodiversity loss. In contrast, the poorest 10% contributed less than 5.4% across any of these metrics. Per capita, the richest 10% imposed environmental burdens 4.2 to 77 times greater than those of the poorest. The inequality points to a logical solution: if the top 20% reduced their consumption to the lowest levels within their group, global environmental pressures could decrease by 25–53%. Addressing consumption patterns in food and services alone could reverse critical land-system changes and biodiversity loss, bringing these measures back within safe planetary limits.

Source: Tian, P., Zhong, H., Chen, X., Feng, K., Sun, L., Zhang, N., … & Hubacek, K. (2024). Keeping the global consumption within the planetary boundaries. Nature, 1-6.

5Nov

The World’s priorities

The Global South isn’t disappearing—it’s increasingly global, as seen in widening income gaps, entrenched poverty, and the ongoing extraction of resources and labour-power toward the global North. This reflects a five-century-long expansion of capitalism, which dictates global priorities in investment, production, and consumption. These choices are shaped by powerful states, global institutions, corporations, and an affluent minority. The outcome? A global spending pattern that that all but prioritises the poor as shown in this graph. For instance, funding for universal basic education falls short of U.S. cosmetic spending alone, and ensuring water and sanitation for all costs less than Europe’s annual ice cream purchases. The numbers are from the late 1990s, but the message endures.

Source: Thomas, C. (1999). Where is the Third World now? Review of International Studies 25(5): 225-244.

28Oct

Skyrocketing Income Inequality

Mainstream trade theories might claim that trade growth narrows economic gaps, but the numbers tell a different story. From 1950 to 2022, per capita GDP in low-income countries (LICs) rose by 42%, while high-income countries (HICs) surged by 385%—and that’s just scratching the surface. Accounting for within-country inequality, things look even worse: in 2022, the poorest 50% of people globally took home only 10% of total income, while the richest 10% pocketed around 44%. Even starker, the richest 1% earned nearly as much as the entire bottom half combined. Since 1950, the richest 10% saw income growth 19.6 times greater than the bottom 50%, and the richest 1% saw growth 48.2 times larger. Inequality hasn’t just grown; it’s skyrocketed.

Based on: UNU-WIDER (2023) World Income Inequality Database (WIID) Companion dataset (wiidcountry and/or wiidglobal). Version 28 November 2023. https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/WIIDcomp-281123